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Abstract 
Using MSA level data, the paper shows, that geographic areas which experienced the 
largest housing bubble generally suffered a more serious subsequent economic downturn.  
More specifically, the paper establishes that MSAs with larger declines in housing permits 
had larger increases in unemployment. There also appears to be strong evidence of a 
correlation between the magnitude of a housing boom and the timing of the decline in 
housing permits. MSAs which experienced larger real housing inflation offered early 
indications of the subsequent Great Recession.  
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I. Introduction 
 This thesis is about the housing bubble preceding the Great Recession1 (December 
2007-June 2009) and the subsequent burst of the bubble impacting real economic activity 
in an unprecedented way. Let me set the tone for the analysis: Figure 1 show the 
appreciation in U.S. home prices beginning in the mid-1990s. 
Figure 1: U.S. Real GDP and Real House Prices, 1975-2011 
 
The acceleration in housing prices, driven in part by loose mortgage regulation and 
low interest rates, eventually became unsustainable (Furman 2014, 1). Coinciding with this 
development, residential investment accelerated. At its peak in 2006, residential 
investment rose to a post war historical high of 6.5% of GDP before plunging into the 
abyss, leading into the most recent recession (see Figure 2). Even now, seven years into 
                                               
1 According to the Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Great Recession 
started in December, 2007 and ended in June, 2009. 
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the expansion, residential investment is still at levels hardly seen during the post-World 
War II period. As a share of GDP, it has only been lower at the end of the Volcker 
Recession, which was characterized by record high real interest rates, and following the 
1990/1991 downturn. 
Figure 2: U.S. Residential Investment, Percent of GDP, 1947-2015
 
 The impact of the Great Recession on the wealth of the average American family 
was devastating – major stock market indices fell nearly 50%, house prices dropped by 
27.5% below their peak (on average), the net worth of the typical American family was 
reduced by 38.8%, and unemployment rose from 5.0% to 10.1% (Bricker, et al. 2012, 5). 
These results represent nation-wide averages, and there was much regional variation: the 
most affected regional areas experienced significantly more severe declines. The 2007 
economic collapse caught most Americans completely by surprise, but for the 
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macroeconomists that knew where to look, the writing was on the wall. Then again, very 
few of them knew where to look, so it appears. 
The explanation of business cycles is one of the primary concerns of 
macroeconomics. Indeed, the field was developed by Keynes in response to the failure of 
the Classical Theory to explain the Great Depression. Forecasting aggregate economic 
activity is a major concern of the discipline. Economic downturns are typically seen as the 
result of macroeconomic shocks (monetary shocks, oil price shocks) or inventory cycles in 
automobiles and/or housing. The director of the prestigious Anderson School Forecast at 
UCLA, Edward Leamer, has emphasized the role that housing starts play in forecasting 
business cycles. Leamer sees this variable as the primary leading indicator of business 
cycle movements. “Residential investment offers the best early warning sign of an 
oncoming recession of the components of GDP” (Leamer 2007, 1). To an outsider, this 
must be somewhat surprising given that residential investment only makes up a small share 
of GDP (4.7% on average). 
Most of the literature on the role of the housing market in the business cycle uses 
national aggregate data. This thesis will try to advance the understanding of the topic by 
investigating Metropolitan Statistical Area2 (MSA) level data, analyzing those 
geographical localities that experienced the largest boom in the housing market prior to the 
onset of the recession. The purpose of the thesis is to first explore to what extent MSAs 
                                               
2 Metropolitan statistical areas are geographic entities delineated by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) for use by Federal statistical agencies in collecting, tabulating, and publishing Federal statistics. A 
metro area contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more in population. Each metro area consists of one or 
more counties and includes the counties containing the core urban area.  
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with larger housing bubbles3 had larger recessions, and then to additionally examine if 
these MSAs offer an earlier indication of the recession.  Specifically: 
● Did MSAs that experienced larger housing bubbles suffer worse recessions? 
 
● Did MSAs that experienced larger housing bubbles offer earlier indications of the 
recession? 
 
Section II provides background on the Great Recession, and Section III summarizes 
the existing literature related to the questions above. Section IV develops a metric for 
housing bubbles for the purpose of this thesis and, using this measure, calculates which 
MSAs experienced the biggest housing bubbles prior to the Great Recession. The MSAs 
with the largest real housing price inflation during the national housing boom mostly had 
the largest housing bubbles. Section V examines to what extent MSAs with larger housing 
bubbles had larger declines in GDP, and addresses the connection between reductions in 
housing permits and subsequent rises in unemployment. In general, MSAs with the larger 
housing bubbles had more severe recessions, and MSAs with larger declines in housing 
permits had larger increases in unemployment. Section VI examines which MSAs show 
the earliest signs of the oncoming recession. Decline in housing permits plays a central role 
in the time sequencing. Section VI concludes with evidence that MSAs which experienced 
larger housing booms and bubbles also saw earlier housing permit peaks, adding support 
to the conclusion that these MSAs offered an earlier indication of the upcoming recession.  
                                               
3 The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco defines the term “bubble” as an asset price that has risen 
above the level justified by economic fundamentals. 
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II. Background 
 “Somewhat frighteningly, each one of us did what was sensible given the incentives we 
faced.” - Raghuram Rajan 
 
Many have sought to assign blame for the financial crisis. The political left blames 
greedy bankers.  The right claims it was the government’s fault. However, reality, as usual, 
is more complex. Professor Rajan of the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business 
offers a broader explanation of the “fault lines” along the tectonic plates of the global 
economy that pushed the world into a financial earthquake. 
         One of the first fault lines that formed in the U.S. occurred as total economic output 
grew in the years before the recession.  Middle-class wages in the U.S. stagnated and 
income inequality rose. Since government cannot easily raise incomes, the political 
response was to lower interest rates making borrowing easier (Rajan 2011, 34). The Federal 
Reserve began to implement a dramatic and determined series of policies to reduce the 
federal funds rate, resulting in its drop from 6.4% in December, 2001 to 1% in July, 2003 
(Fast and Loose 2007, 1). 
         Cheap financing accelerated the growth in the housing market. In addition to many 
new homebuyers, rising home prices led to real estate speculation, the expectation that 
prices would keep rising, described by many as the “the greater fool theory” of investing. 
Buying property for investment accounted for a rising share of the market, and 
homebuilders responded to the huge demand. The number of housing starts jumped from 
1.5 million, at an annual rate, in August 2000 to a peak of 2.3 million in January 2006 (Fast 
and Loose 2007, 3). 
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Much of this growth was financed by financial institutions with irresponsible 
mortgage lending policies due to an industry wide reduction in lending standards. 
Subprime4 loans were offered to borrowers with poor credit (Rajan 2011, 57).  In 2005, 
over 60% of all new mortgages in California (and 33% nationally) were structured as 
negative-amortization5 or interest-only loans, up from 8% in 2002. These loans were 
effectively a gamble that prices would continue to rise at least long enough for these homes 
to be either flipped or refinanced. Otherwise, expensive principal repayments are 
engineered to kick-in after an initial period (In Come the Waves 2005, 2). Even worse, 
these loans were usually adjustable-rate mortgages6 (ARMs), exposing borrowers to 
changes in interest rates. Issuance of ARMs rose to 50% of all mortgages in 2005 in the 
states with the biggest price rises (In Come the Waves 2005, 3). Financial institutions were 
well compensated to assemble different types of risky mortgages and securitize them into 
lower-risk, diversified, mortgage backed securities (MBSs) (The Origins of the Financial 
Crisis Crash Course 2013, 2). The belief that pooling mortgages diversified away risk is 
based on the risky assumption that the individual mortgage risks are not correlated. The 
pooled mortgages were used to back securities known as collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs).7 The true risk of these CDOs was further hidden by the fact that most of them 
                                               
4 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation defines subprime as credit or loan arrangements for borrowers 
with a poor credit history. Subprime loans typically having unfavorable conditions such as high interest 
rates. 
5 According to the National Association of Realtors, a negative amortization loan is a loan in which the 
buyer pays less than the interest due and the unpaid principal and interest is added onto the loan, and after 
an initial period, payments surge as principal repayments kicks in. 
6 An adjustable-rate mortgage, defined by Investopedia, is a type of mortgage in which the interest rate 
applied on the outstanding balance varies throughout the life of the loan based on a benchmark or index 
plus an additional spread, called an ARM margin. To start, the rate is fixed for an initial amount of time 
7 According to the Federal Reserve, a CDO is a type of structured asset-backed security. The CDO market 
encompasses the MBS market. 
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received AAA ratings by agencies8 such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s (Beattie n.d., 
1). “When easy money pushed by a deep pocketed government comes into contact with the 
profit motive of a sophisticated, amoral financial sector, a deep fault line develops" (Rajan 
2011, 79). 
         The second fault line that contributed to the crisis was the sizeable and sustained 
exporting of goods and resources by many countries. Rich countries like Germany and 
Japan have greatly increased their wealth and national GDP through their export sectors. 
That strength comes at the cost of weakness in domestic industries such as banking and 
retailing. China and other poorer countries also built up trade imbalances with the U.S, but 
from a different path. The financial crises in the 1990s showed them the dangers of relying 
on money flowing from rich countries. Consequently, they borrowed less and exported 
more to fuel their economies. Before the crisis, countries like China and countries like 
Germany, with large trade surpluses and therefore a lot of money in U.S. currency, began 
to search for foreign investment. That supply of investment met a lot of demand for 
borrowing in the U.S., resulting in more foolish lending (Rajan 2011, 88). 
         The third fault line had the effect of widening the crisis. U.S. approach to recession-
fighting has been to preserve a social safety net and enhance job creation from resulting 
under-employment.  As a result, U.S.  fiscal and monetary policies in the 20th century have 
supported recoveries generating very rapid results, not the jobless recoveries that appear 
now to be the norm. Pressure is put on government to cut taxes, increase spending and keep 
interest rates low. This leads major financial institutions to adjust their own risk profile, 
                                               
8 Credit rating is a highly concentrated industry where three agencies, Moody’s Investors Service, Standard 
& Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings control approximately 95% of the global market. 
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appropriately assuming that government would need to keep the money flowing and step 
in if catastrophe occurs (Rajan 2011).   
Large banks heavily invested in mortgage-backed securities because they believed 
them to be safe while offering high returns. High worldwide demand for U.S. mortgage 
backed securities and the willingness of lesser-regulated insurers such as AIG to offer 
default coverage fueled these investments.  The boom proved unsustainable when home 
foreclosure rates and subprime mortgage delinquencies post-2006 substantially increased, 
resulting in declining value of CDOs and mortgage backed securities (The Financial Crisis 
Full Timeline n.d., 3). This led to large losses for banks and other financial institutions and 
many faced bankruptcy. The dire state of the financial system forced the U.S. government 
to the pass the Troubled Asset Relief Program (T.A.R.P.) in October, 2008. The 
government bought $426.4 billion in toxic assets from the struggling financial institutions 
to strengthen the financial sector. The accelerating turmoil resulted in a credit freeze that 
brought the global financial system to the brink of total collapse (Beattie n.d., 2). 
It is widely believed that better monetary policy could have mitigated the effects of 
the Great Recession. Economist John Taylor claims that the Federal Reserve is at fault for 
holding the federal funds rate historically low after 2002 (Taylor 2010, 3). Figure 3 shows 
what policy would have been had it followed the Taylor Rule along with what the actual 
policy was. This was the greatest deviation from the Taylor rule in over 20 years (Taylor 
2010, 4). 
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Figure 39: Effective Federal Funds Rate 
 
         The effect of low interest rates was an acceleration of the home building clock 
according to Leamer (2007, 5).  Low rates made financing cheaper, which led to more risk 
taking in housing finance, adding fuel to the housing boom. As discussed earlier, these 
factors helped drive the growth that proved to be unsustainable when housing market 
finally crashed, leading to a credit crisis, and finally resulting in what we now call the Great 
Recession.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
9 Source: Taylor, Housing and Monetary Policy 2007 
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III. Literature Review 
There is an enormous amount of literature in economics dedicated to the use of 
various methodologies behind examining the business cycle. For the purpose of this paper 
I am centrally focused on literature relating to the housing market. 
 Leamer (2007, 13) claims that housing is the most important sector in recessions 
saying, “Of the components of GDP, residential investment offers by far the best early 
warning sign of an oncoming recession.” Since World War II, we have had nine recessions 
preceded by irregularities in housing. Residential investment decline slows GDP growth 
before recessions, then reverses contributing more than normal during the second or third 
quarter of the recessions. Conversely, business investment in equipment and software 
contribute less in economic weakening before recessions and recover more slowly in the 
later stages of recessions. Davis and Heathcote’s (2001, 1) findings agree with Leamer that 
residential investment is a leading indicator of a recessionary cycle and add that non-
residential investment lags the cycle. 
 Leamer (2007, 25) goes on to argue that homes don’t have a price cycle but rather 
a volume cycle. That is to say that home prices are sticky while on the decline. Softening 
in demand results in lower sales volume, but prices do not quickly adjust. Resulting decline 
in home sales volume correlates with similar declines in jobs in construction, real estate 
brokerages and finance. 
 City level data shows that real housing price inflation is strongly influenced by real 
changes in income, the growth of population, construction costs, and interest rates (Jud and 
Winkler 2002, 14). The housing market is a city-level phenomenon because housing is a 
non-tradable good (Ghent and Owyang 2010, 336). Time dummies explain only a quarter 
11 
 
of the variation in city-level house price changes, which suggests that most of the variation 
in house prices is driven by city-specific factors (Glaeser and Gyourko 2007, 2). State-level 
data shows that the timing, and in some cases the number of recessionary experiences, vary 
across regions (Owyang et al. 2008, 4).  Some research concludes that growth rates in 
housing variables appear to slow ahead of city-level peaks, but find no consistent statistical 
relationship suggesting a city’s permits or prices influence its business cycle (Ghent and 
Owyang 2010, 336).  
 Gallin (2008, 2) shows that there is empirical support to make the claim that the 
ratio of housing price to rent is an effective means to analyze comparative valuation in the 
housing market. He explains that the price-rent ratio can predict future changes in real rents 
and prices similar to the dividend-price ratio in the stock market. Campbell and Shiller 
(2001, 1) show that when stock prices are high relative to dividends, future price growth 
for stocks is subdued. Gallin (2008, 3) argues that the analogous statement is true for the 
housing market. Periods in which house prices are high relative to rents are often followed 
by periods where real rent prices appreciate faster than normal, and real housing prices 
appreciate slower than average. A “bubble” develops in the stock and housing markets 
when prices of assets deviates from their fundamental value.  While fundamental value at 
the time cannot be calculated because it is unobservable, analysts nevertheless use the 
price-rent ratio as a way to estimate housing prices relative to fundamental value (Krainer 
and Wei 2004, 3). 
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IV. Identifying the Bubble 
I collected monthly housing price index data for the U.S. and the forty10 most 
populated MSAs from the Freddie Mac Housing Price Index. I then seasonally adjusted the 
data from June 1996 to June 2016 using EViews Census XII seasonal adjustment tool. For 
inflation adjustments, I seasonally adjusted the Consumer Price Index "All Items Less 
Shelter"11 series from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the four regions of the United 
States: Northeast, Midwest, West, and South. I then adjusted each MSA’s HPI data for 
inflation by region using the seasonally adjusted regional CPI data.12 
 After making these adjustments, I discovered that housing prices peaked nationally 
in March of 2006. In order to capture which MSAs experienced the largest housing boom,13 
I examined the housing price inflation for each MSA over the same time that best 
encapsulates the overall housing boom.14 To do this, I calculated the real HPI growth of 
each MSA for the 52 months from when the U.S. exited the Dotcom Recession in 
November, 2001 to March, 2006, when real house prices peaked nationally.15,16 
 
 
 
                                               
10 The 40 most populated MSAs comprise 46.8% of the total population in 2010 according the Census 
Bureau. 
11 The Federal Housing Finance Agency recommends to use the Consumer Price Index “All Items Less 
Shelter” series for inflation adjustments. 
12 Nominal values adjusted for inflation become real values. 
13 I will refer to real housing price index growth as housing price inflation. 
14 I initially thought that in order best capture which MSAs experienced the largest housing price inflation, 
I would calculate the real HPI growth for a uniform amount of time preceding each MSA’s real HPI peak. I 
had to address the issue that some of the MSAs experienced little change in real housing prices and their 
real HPIs peaked years before the national peak. As an example, real housing prices for Detroit and 
Cleveland peaked in 2003.   
15 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Dotcom Recession spanned from March, 
2001 until November, 2001. 
16 For the purpose of my analysis, I have defined the duration of the national housing boom as the period 
from November, 2001 until March, 2006. The housing boom refers to real housing price inflation  
13 
 
Figure 4: Housing Price Inflation, November, 2001 - March, 2006 
 
 Figure 4 shows the ten MSAs that experienced the largest housing price inflation 
over that 52-month time span. Interestingly, of the ten MSAs that experienced the real 
largest real inflation in housing prices, seven are located in coastal states, and three are in 
California. Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario experienced the largest boom in housing 
prices growing 106% during the period, nearly three times the national average.  
 Figure 5 shows the boom and bust of the ten MSAs that had the most real HPI 
growth. The U.S. real HPI slowly crept up to its peak in 2006, and slowly declined 
thereafter. These MSA’s experienced sharper increases before their peaks and sharper 
declines after them. The only exception was Virginia Beach, which peaked 8-months later 
in November, 2006. 
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Figure 5: Top 10 MSA Housing Price Inflation, 2001 - 2009  
 
 It would be inaccurate to conclude that the 10 MSAs with the greatest real price 
appreciation in housing are the MSAs with the largest housing bubbles.  An examination 
of price inflation alone does not account for changes in fundamental value of these housing 
assets in local markets. In order to address this issue, I look at real rent levels and how they 
relate to real housing prices. 
Rents, similar to incomes, are typically tied closely to supply and demand 
fundamentals.  Rent bubbles do not generally occur and therefore are a good metric for the 
fundamental value of housing. A rapid increase in home prices combined with a flat rental 
market can signal the onset of a bubble (Krainer and Wei 2004, 2). Economists are hesitant 
to identify bubbles when they appear to be forming because it is far from obvious exactly 
how large and how long-lasting a deviation from the norm must be to conclude a bubble 
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exists. However, given the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that a housing bubble did form 
prior to the Great Recession. I will examine which MSAs experienced the largest 
percentage change in real price-rent ratio over the same period defined earlier (November, 
2001 – March, 2006).17 
 I collected monthly and semi-annual rent data for 2518 of the 40 MSAs and the U.S. 
average from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. There are two possible series of rent data, 
“rent of primary residence”, and “owner’s equivalent rent of primary residence”. I collected 
both series for the U.S. and for each of the 25 MSAs and averaged them. Most previous 
literature only uses rent of primary residence because it is available for a longer period of 
time,19 but I am only concerned with the recent period leading into the Great Recession. 
The two series are 99% correlated, suggesting the choice of using one or both would not 
produce significantly different results. I seasonally adjusted the data from June 1996 to 
June 2016 using EViews Census XII seasonal adjustment tool. To adjust the rent data for 
inflation, I used the seasonally adjusted CPI "All Items Less Shelter" series from the BLS 
by region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17 The housing bubble refers to percentage increase in the real price-rent ratio. 
18 Rent data is unavailable for Austin, Baltimore, Charlotte, Columbus, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Las 
Vegas, Nashville, Orlando, Providence, Riverside, Sacramento, San Antonio, San Jose, and Virginia Beach 
19 Joshua Gallin uses the rent of primary residence series in his article, “The Long-Run Relationship 
Between House Prices and Rents” (2008) because that series is available longer, and he writes that owner’s 
equivalent rent series is preferable. 
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Figure 6: U.S. Real HPI and Real RPI, 1983-2015 
 
 Figure 6 illustrates the typically steady relationship between real rents and real 
housing prices while also showing the drastic deviation in the ratio in the years leading up 
to the housing market crash. From November 2001 to March 2006, real rent prices grew 
only .2% while real housing prices grew 37%. 
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Figure 7: Increase in Real Price-Rent Ratio vs. Real Housing Price 
Inflation, 2001 – 2006 
 
 
 Figure 7 shows the 70% correlation between the real price rent percentage change 
and the real house price percentage change across the set of 25 MSAs that I examined. 
Additionally, real growth in house prices explain 92% of the variation of the percentage 
increase in the real price rent ratio, while real growth in rent prices only explain 23% of 
the variation of real growth in the price rent ratio (see Appendix 1). In other words, the 
change in real house prices substantially account for the percentage increase in the real 
price-rent ratio. 
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Table 120, 21: Price-Rent Ratio Change and HPI Growth for 25 MSAs   
MSA 
Real Price-Rent Ratio 
Change 
Real HPI 
Growth 
HPI 
Rank 
Real RPI 
Growth 
RPI 
Rank 
Phoenix 83% 79% 3 -2% 12 
Miami 75% 92% 2 10% 3 
Los Angeles 72% 96% 1 13% 1 
San Francisco 64% 51% 7 -8% 22 
Tampa 63% 70% 5 5% 6 
Washington D.C. 61% 71% 4 6% 4 
Portland 52% 43% 10 -6% 21 
Seattle 49% 40% 11 -6% 20 
San Diego 48% 66% 6 13% 2 
Philadelphia 40% 44% 9 3% 7 
New York 39% 47% 8 6% 5 
Chicago 27% 25% 12 -2% 11 
Minneapolis 27% 20% 13 -5% 19 
Milwaukee 24% 20% 14 -3% 16 
Atlanta 19% 5% 19 -11% 25 
Boston 16% 19% 15 2% 8 
St. Louis 14% 16% 16 2% 9 
Denver 13% 1% 22 -11% 24 
Dallas 12% 1% 23 -10% 23 
Kansas City 9% 5% 18 -3% 14 
Houston 8% 5% 17 -3% 13 
Cincinnati 7% 2% 21 -4% 17 
Pittsburgh 4% 3% 20 -1% 10 
Cleveland 4% -1% 24 -5% 18 
Detroit -2% -5% 25 -3% 15 
 
The real HPI shown in Table 1 provides a ranking of real house price appreciation 
for the 25 MSAs under examination. The eleven MSAs that have the greatest percentage 
increase in the real price-rent ratio are all in the top eleven for HPI rank. This agrees with 
the finding from the regression, that growth in real house prices are the primary driver of 
growth in real price-rent ratio. The MSAs that provide the best indication of the existence 
                                               
20 Table 1 is sorted by largest deviation in the real price-rent ratio. 
21 The HPI and RPI rank columns in table 1 are the real house price growth rank and real rent price growth 
for these 25 MSAs. Real rent prices that declined are highlighted in red. Top half HPI growth are 
highlighted green 
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of a bubble in terms of percentage increase real in price-rent ratio are also those that rank 
highest in house price inflation (housing boom).22 
 Now that we know which MSAs experienced the largest housing bubble, we will 
now seek evidence whether a correlation exists between housing bubble and the resulting 
size of recessions. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
22 The housing bubble refers to percentage increase in the real price-rent ratio. The housing boom refers to 
real housing price inflation. 
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V. Housing and the Magnitude of the Great Recession 
This section is broken in two parts. Part (a) investigates the relationship between 
the magnitude of the housing bubble and the magnitude of the recession. This will test to 
see if an MSA that had a large increase in their real price-rent ratio saw larger declines in 
real GDP and increases in unemployment. Part (b) will take a closer look at that question. 
It will examine the relationship between the declines in housing starts and increases in 
unemployment. This examination will test the correlation between the rise in overall 
unemployment and the increase in unemployment in the housing sector. 
 
V.a. Did Bigger Housing Bubble Translate to Bigger Recession? 
To address the question whether MSAs that experienced a larger housing bubble 
also suffer the worst recessions, I look at percentage declines in real GDP and percentage 
point increases in unemployment. I collected annual chained-2009 GDP data for the U.S. 
and for the 40 most populated MSAs from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. I collected 
monthly unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the U.S. and the set 
of MSAs. I then seasonally adjusted the data from June 1996 to June 2016 using EViews 
Census XII seasonal adjustment tool.  
I calculated the percentage decline in real GDP during from the Great Recession by 
taking the difference of each MSA’s minimum real GDP after or during the recession and 
subtracted it by their maximum real GDP before the recession and divided the difference 
by the maximum value. Figure 8 is a scatter plot of the percentage increase in the real price-
rent ratio versus declines in real GDP with a fitted trend line.  
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Figure 823: Increase in Real Price-Rent Ratio vs. Decline in Real GDP 
 
This relationship provides evidence that MSAs with larger housing bubbles had 
larger recessions. Percentage increase in the real price-rent ratio has a negative 44% 
correlation with percentage declines in real GDP. Additionally, in a regression of 
percentage declines in real GDP on the real price-rent ratio change, the coefficient is 
statistically significant24 at a 97% confidence-level (see Appendix 2).  It is important to 
note that the calculation for real decline in GDP relies on annual data, therefore 
comparisons are limited and not as precise as if we were to be able to use monthly data. 
Unemployment data is available monthly by MSA, so it may be a more robust 
comparative tool. 
                                               
23 Detroit is omitted from the scatter plot because it is an extreme outlier. The trend is still statistically 
significant with the inclusion of Detroit. However, omitting Detroit increases the significance and better 
displays the relationship. Detroit’s recession began in 2005 because of the decline of its automobile and 
manufacturing sector. The early recession meant continued large declines in GDP, but no increase in home 
value. 
24 Typically, regression coefficients are only considered statistically significant if they are significant at a 
90% confidence level, meaning P>|t| = .1 or lower. 
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To find the increase in the level of unemployment from the Great Recession, I took 
the difference of each MSA’s maximum unemployment after or during the recession and 
subtracted it by their minimum unemployment before the recession. Figure 9 is a scatter 
plot of the percentage increase in the real price-rent ratio versus increases in unemployment 
with a fitted trend line. 
Figure 925: Increase in Price-Rent Ratio vs. Increase in Unemployment 
 
 As expected, this trend agrees with the trend from figure 9 and provides additional 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that MSAs with larger housing bubbles had larger 
recessions. Percentage increase in the real price-rent ratio has a 66% correlation with 
increases in the level of unemployment. In a regression of the percentage point increase in 
the unemployment rate on the percentage real price-rent ratio change, the coefficient is 
statistically significant at a 99% confidence-level (see Appendix 2). The relationship 
                                               
25 Detroit is omitted from the scatter plot again because it is an extreme outlier. 
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between the magnitude of the bubble and increases in unemployment is stronger than that 
of the declines in real GDP. It is reasonable to hypothesize that at least some of the 
difference is explained by the use of monthly versus annual data. 
 GDP and unemployment are the two most important metrics for measuring the 
severity of an economic downturn. Given that the percentage increase in the real price-rent 
ratio is significantly correlated with the severity of recession, it is safe to say that MSAs 
that experienced larger housing bubbles in general faced greater recessionary impacts. 
 
V.b. Declines in Housing Starts and Increases in Unemployment 
This section examines the relationship between housing starts and unemployment. 
It is centered around the idea that housing permit declines represent job losses in the 
housing sector. The sectors most affected would be those closely related to permit 
generation such as new home construction, but there will also be job loss found in other 
downstream sectors such as real estate brokerage and mortgage financing. The expectation 
is that declines in housing starts are highly correlated with a rise in unemployment.  
I collected MSA-level monthly housing permit data for 3926 of the most populated 
MSAs along with national housing permit data from the Federal Reserve Economic 
Database. Residential investment is unavailable at the MSA-level, so I instead use housing 
permits, an excellent proxy because the correlation between residential investment and 
permit values at the national level is 98 percent. Permits are typically attained one to three 
months before construction begins27(Ghent and Owyang, 337).  
                                               
26 Housing permit data is unavailable for Providence-Warwick MSA 
27 The U.S. Census Bureau claims that on average, “construction is undertaken for all but a very small 
percentage of housing units authorized by building permits. A major portion typically get underway during 
the month of permit issuance and most of the remainder begin within the three following months”. 
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There is a substantial amount of high-frequency variation for MSA-level housing 
permits, but all data combined exhibits strong low-frequency variation. The MSA permit 
data must be filtered to isolate the business cycle relationships. I follow the approach of 
Ghant and Owyang by using an optimal band-pass filter28 for each series. These filters 
isolate the cyclical component of a time series by specifying a range for its duration (2010, 
337). Once the data is optimally band-pass filtered for each series, I standardize29 the 
housing price data and the housing permit data in order to make better comparisons.30 
Figure 10: Increase in Unemployment vs. Decreases in Housing Permits 
 
 Figure 10 graphically displays the negative 47% correlation between rise in 
unemployment and declines in housing permits. In a regression of unemployment on 
                                               
28 I used EViews to perform the optimal band-pass filter transformation, with cycles of 18 to 96 months. 
29 Standardized values show how many standard deviations from the average that value lies. Xs= (xi-μ)/σ 
Where Xs is the standardized value, xi is the raw value, μ is the average of the series, and σ is the standard 
deviation  
30 I used the standardize function in Excel for all series over the same time-span. 
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housing permit declines, the coefficient is statistically significant at a 98% percent 
confidence level (see Appendix 3). However, one can see that there is still a significant 
amount of deviation from the fitted line. Housing permit decline only explains 22% of the 
variation in the rise of unemployment. 
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VI. Relationship Between Magnitude of Housing Bubble and Timing of 
the Decline of Housing Permits 
 
 Decline in housing starts are known to be one of the best leading economic 
indicators31 of a recession. Leamer (2007, 16) found that residential investment contributes 
to weakness in GDP most before recessions. This is to say that declines in housing starts 
lead overall economic downturns. When addressing a leading economic indicator and 
examining its efficacy, questions of timing are of most importance, not of magnitude. 
Section V(b) addressed questions dealing with the magnitude of housing permit declines.  
This section examines its timing. 
Figure 11: United States Real Price-Rent Ratio and Housing Permits, 
2001 - 2009 
 
                                               
31 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, a leading indicator is a measurable economic 
factor that changes before the economy starts to follow a particular pattern or trend. 
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 As Figure 11 clearly illustrates, U.S. new construction housing permits peaked 
before the real price to rent ratio peaked; both peaking well before the start of the recession. 
In order to examine if the MSAs showing evidence of being in a housing bubble offered 
an earlier indication of recession, I analyze the dates of the housing permit peaks and 
compare these dates to the national peak, October, 2005. 
Figure 1232: Increase in Price-Rent Ratio vs. Timing of Housing Permit 
Decline 
 
 Figure 12 shows that there exists a substantial relationship between real increase in 
the price-rent ratio and the timing of the decline in housing starts. Housing starts decline 
sooner in MSAs that demonstrate a larger housing bubble. However, this appears to provide 
a relatively weak relationship; there is only a negative 37% correlation between the two 
series. Nevertheless, in a regression of housing permit decline on the real price-rent ratio 
                                               
32 Detroit is omitted from the scatter plot again because it is an extreme outlier. 
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change, the coefficient is significant at the 93% confidence level (see Appendix 4), offering 
statistically significant support. 
Evidence suggests that deviation in the real price-rent ratio is a good indicator of a 
bubble, but real housing price inflation is likely to be more highly correlated with housing 
permits. Regressions show that neither real housing price appreciation, nor real increases 
in the price-rent ratio are significant coefficients in explaining the magnitude of increases 
and declines in housing permits (see Appendix 5). Nevertheless, it will be helpful to 
analyze the timing of the decline in housing permits in relation to housing price inflation 
for the full set of 40 MSAs. 
Figure 1333: Housing Price Inflation vs. Timing of Housing Permit 
Decline 
 
                                               
33 Detroit is omitted from the scatter plot again because it is an extreme outlier. 
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 Figure 13 shows that there exists a stronger relationship between housing price 
inflation and the timing of the decline in housing starts. Housing starts declined sooner in 
MSAs with larger increases in house price inflation. This is only a slightly stronger 
relationship; there is only a negative 39% correlation between the two series. In a 
regression of housing permit decline on the real housing price appreciation, the coefficient 
is significant at the 99% confidence level (see Appendix 4). 
Figure 14: Timing of Housing Permit Decline 
 
Figure 14 illustrates the overall relationship between the timing of the peaks and 
the housing boom. The top 10 MSAs with the largest boom on average peak one month 
before the national average, and the bottom 10 MSAs peak two months after the national 
average. There is a great deal of variation in the timing of MSA level housing permit peaks, 
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however general housing permits demonstrate peaks sooner among those MSAs with larger 
housing bubbles and larger real housing booms. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 This thesis investigates the relationship between the Great Recession and the 
housing market at the MSA-level. To summarize, I initially examined whether MSAs that 
experienced the largest bubble in housing prices relative to rent prices subsequently also 
saw the greatest recessionary downturn. Percentage increases in the real price-rent ratio are 
positively correlated to declines in real GDP and increases in unemployment. The data 
supports the hypothesis that MSAs which experienced larger housing bubbles suffered a 
more severe economic decline. Contradictory to previous finding in the literature (Ghent 
and Owyang 2010), there is a consistent relationship between MSAs housing permit 
activity and its influences on the local MSA business cycle: there is a statistically 
significant relationship between housing permit declines and the rise in unemployment at 
the MSA-level. It is likely that I found this relationship while previous literature did not as 
a result of focusing on the Great Recession. 
 The second question this thesis examines is whether MSAs that experienced larger 
housing bubbles offer any earlier indication of the upcoming recession. I address this 
question by examining the timing in which housing permits peaked across MSAs. The 
timing of these peaks in permit activity varied greatly across the MSAs. There is evidence 
of a significant correlation between MSAs seeing the largest bubbles and housing permits 
peaking earlier relative to the downturn.  
This thesis did not attempt to address the relationship between consumer debt and 
the housing bubble. Many of the regions of the United States that had the largest housing 
boom had the highest concentration of adjustable rate, negative-amortization, and interest-
only mortgages (In Come the Waves, 2005). Subsequent research should focus on the 
32 
 
questions addressed in this thesis considering this aspect of how the rapid increase in 
consumer debt and resulting homeowner foreclosures responded to local MSA price 
bubbles and the timing of the collapse.  
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Appendix 
 
1. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Increase in 
Housing Bubble 
Increase in 
Housing Bubble 
   
Real Housing Price 
Inflation 
0.784*** 
(0.0511) 
 
 
 
 
Real Rent Price 
Inflation 
 1.799*** 
(0.517) 
  
 
Constant 0.0748*** 0.347*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0452) 
   
Observations 25 25 
R-squared 0.920 0.230 
     Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES GDP Decline Unemployment Increase 
   
Percentage 
Increase in Real 
Price-Rent Ratio  
-0.0552* 
(0.0285) 
0.0372*** 
(0.00864) 
 
  
Constant -0.0214** 0.0462*** 
 (0.00881) (0.00275) 
   
Observations 24 24 
R-squared 0.197 0.433 
          Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
35 
 
3. 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Unemployment Increase 
  
Housing Permit Decline -0.0101*** 
 (0.00290) 
Constant 0.0211* 
 (0.0113) 
  
Observations 39 
R-squared 0.222 
     Robust standard errors in parentheses 
         *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Housing Permit Peak Housing Permit Peak 
   
Percentage 
Increase in Real 
Price-Rent Ratio  
-11.47* 
(6.091) 
 
 
 
 
Real Housing 
Price Inflation 
 -8.815** 
(3.331) 
  
 
Constant 6.546** 5.804*** 
 (2.661) (1.758) 
   
Observations 24 38 
R-squared 0.136 0.154 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Housing Permit 
Increase 
Housing Permit 
Decline 
Housing Permit 
Increase 
Housing Permit 
Decline 
     
Real Housing 
Price Inflation 
0.371 
(0.385) 
-0.0963 
(0.397) 
  
     
Percentage 
Increase in Real 
Price-Rent Ratio  
  0.319 
(0.530) 
0.0593 
(0.533) 
     
Constant 2.228*** -4.129*** 2.111*** -4.132*** 
 (0.174) (0.194) (0.223) (0.252) 
     
Observations 39 39 25 25 
R-squared 0.025 0.001 0.016 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Data Appendix 
Variables Methodology Source 
Real housing price inflation 
(real housing boom 
increase) 
Percentage increase in the 
real HPI from November, 
2001 to March, 2006 
Freddie Mac Housing 
Price Index  
Real rent price inflation  Percentage increase in the 
real RPI from November, 
2001 to March, 2006 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Real percentage increase in 
the price-rent ratio (real 
housing bubble increase) 
Percentage increase in the 
real price-rent ratio from 
November 2001 to March, 
2006 
Freddie Mac Housing 
Price Index  and Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 
Housing permit peak Difference in date of peak 
from the national peak in 
months 
Federal Reserve 
Economic Database 
Housing permit increase Difference between housing 
permit peaks before the 
recession and average 
monthly housing permits. 
Data is standardized, so the 
increase is simply the peak 
value.  
Federal Reserve 
Economic Database 
Housing permit decline Difference between housing 
permit peaks before the 
recession and housing permit 
troughs during or afterwards 
Federal Reserve 
Economic Database 
Increase in unemployment Difference between 
unemployment troughs 
before the recession and 
unemployment peaks during 
or afterwards 
Federal Reserve 
Economic Database 
Percentage decline in GDP Difference between GDP 
peaks before the recession 
and GDP troughs during or 
afterwards 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
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